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I. INTRODUCTION
The Arizona Supreme Court ("Court") recently rejected the State of Arizona's appeal to recognize implied federal reserved water rights for Arizona's
State Trust Lands.' The Court's decision is the latest in a series of cases the
Court heard in the Gila River System Adjudication and the Little Colorado
River Adjudication (collectively, "Adjudications").' The Arizona Legislature
*
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1. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source
(Cl/a River lA), 289 P.3d 936, 938 (Ariz. 2012).
2. See id.; In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System &
Source (Gla River VII)4, 224 P.3d 178, 182 (Ariz. 2010); In re General Adjudication of All
Rights to Use Water in Gila River System (Gila River VD), 173 P.3d 440, 441 (Ariz. 2007); In
re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source (Cl/a River
V), 127 P.3d 882, 884 (Ariz. 2006); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in
Gila River System & Source (Gila River "), 35 P.3d 68, 70 (Ariz. 2001); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source (Cl/a River IT), 9 P.3d 1069,
1072 (Ariz. 2000); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System
& Source (Cl/a River Ill), 989 P.2d 739, 741 (Ariz. 1999); In re General Adjudication of All
419
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tasked the state courts with administering the Adjudications, which are comprehensive Arizona water cases intended to identify and quantify every individual water right within a river system.'
In In re GeneralAdjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gia River
System and Source ("Gila River IX"), the Court held Congress did not withhold or reserve State Trust Lands for a federal purpose when it granted such
lands to Arizona to raise revenue for schools, nor did Congress intend to reserve water rights along with the land grant.' Thus, the state's water right claim
failed to pass the threshold requirements for a federal reserved water right.'
The federal reserved water rights doctrine is a powerful concept that,
when invoked, steps outside the traditional notions of state-based water rights
systems. Arizona water law uses the prior appropriation doctrine to administer
surface water rights.! Prior appropriation developed from the needs of gold
miners and farmers, and it encourages the efficient development and use of
water in the arid West.' Relying on a "first in time-first in right" seniority sys-

tem, those with the earliest appropriation date (the date the appropriator diverted the water and put it to use) have rights senior to those who appropriated
at a later time.' Thus, a senior appropriator may divert the full amount of its
water right before a junior appropriator may draw from the stream.' Additionally, an appropriator must put a water right to a beneficial use and continue to
use the full extent of its water right in order to keep the right." Judicial inter-

pretation of "beneficial use" has changed over time. While beneficial use originally constituted agricultural, industrial, and municipal uses, most state courts
have since recognized uses like recreation and environmental protection."
In 1908, the US Supreme Court first recognized the implied federal reserved water right doctrine when it provided an Indian reservation with the

water necessary to survive in the arid West." In contrast to Arizona's prior
appropriation system, the federal reserved water rights doctrine sets the pniority date for most reservations at the time of the federal land reservatioil, but
requires no actual use of the water to vest the water right; the right exists in

Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source (Gila River I), 857 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Ariz.
1993); In re Rights to Use of Gila River (GaRiver), 830 P.2d 442, 444 (Ariz. 1992).
3. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-252(a) (2013); E. Brendan Shane, Water Rights and Gila
River III The Winters Doctnne Goes Underground,4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 397, 404
(2001).
4. Gila River IX 289 P.3d at 945.
5. Id.
6. ARIz. CONST. art. XVII, S 2.
7. Sharon Megdal, Joanna Nadeau & Tiffany Tom, The ForgottenSector: Anzona Water
Law and the Enironmen4 I ARIZ.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 243, 265 (2011).
8. John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers
andSreams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 379, 389 (2005).
9. Huning v. Porter, 54 P. 584, 586 (Ariz. 1898).
10. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., 118 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005).
11. Medgal, supranote 7, at 267.
12. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); see United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978).
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perpetuity." Thus, the doctrine provides a valuable tool for meeting the water
needs of federally withdrawn land; needs the federal government cannot always anticipate at the time it makes the reservation." However, the recognition
of implied water rights, after an unaware junior water user has appropriated
5
water, can also prove disruptive and costly to those junior water users.
This Note discusses the context in which the Court decided Gila River IX
and suggests the underlying policies of the federal reserved rights doctrine
supports and illuminates the Court's decision in that case.
II. ARIZONA STATE TRUST LANDS
By 1910, Congress had granted the State of Arizona nearly eleven million
acres of State Trust Lands to raise revenue for state schools." The Arizona
Land Department ("Land Department") administers these State Trust Lands
on behalf of the state." The Organic Act of 1850 established.the Territory of
Arizona and granted sections six and thirty-six of each township to the Territory to fund public schools.'" On June 20, 1910, Arizona achieved statehood
through the State Enabling Act." The Act affirmed the earlier-granted sections
and further assigned sections two and thirty-two of each township to Arizona's
State Trust Lands.' The State Enabling Act requires the State to hold the
lands in trust for public schools and that "lease and sale requirements . .. may
be enforced by the federal government, the state, or any Arizona citizen.""
Furthermore, Congress intended State Trust Lands to generate revenue for
public schools through the sale, lease, and use of the granted land." Currently,
the Land Department administers 5.1 million acres in the Gila River Basin
and 1.4 million acres in the Little Colorado River Basin."

13. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System &
Source (Gi7a River 1), 35 P.3d 68, 73-74 (Ariz. 2001); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,
138 (1976).
14. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 573-74 (1983);
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 718; Cappaert,426 U.S. at 138; Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
15. Richard B. Collins, The Future Course ofthe Winter's Docnne, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
481, 481-82 (1985).
16.

ARIZ. STATE LAND DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT 2010-2011

3 (2011),

available at

http://wmvw.azland.gov/report.htm.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19.

Id.

20. Id.
21. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source
(Gila River IA), 289 P.3d 936, 939 (Ariz. 2012) (citing Enabling Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310,
§S28, 36, 36 Stat. 557, 574 (1908)).
22. Lassen v. Arizona exrel.Ariz. Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 460 (1967).
23. Gila RiverIX, 389 P.3d at 939.
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m. THE GILA RIVER SYSTEM AND THE

ITLE COLORADO
RIVER SYSTEM GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATIONS

Nearly forty years ago, between 1974 and 1980, the Phelps Dodge Corporation and the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association filed petitions with
the Arizona State Land Department ("ASLD") requesting a determination of
water rights on the Gila River and the Little Colorado River." In 1979, the
Arizona Legislature transferred the petitions to Maricopa County Superior
Court ("Superior Court"), and in 1981, the Arizona Supreme Court consolidated the petitions into multiple river-specific adjudications.' Since then, the
Court assigned a single water judge to preside over the Adjudications and a
special master to conduct initial hearings and file reports with the Superior
Court for all subsequent petitions on both river systems. ' As of September
2012, more than 82,000 claims have been filed in the Gila River Adjudication
and 14,000 claims filed in the Little Colorado Adjudication.'
Arizona law requires general adjudications to identify the "extent and relative priority of the water rights of all persons in the river system and source.""
Many Western States have initiated ambitious -general stream adjudications
over the past century, with the hope of providing a single forum to resolve
water rights conflicts and increase certainty and manage the pressures of increasing populations.' Indeed, as early as 1910, the Kent Decree settled water
rights in Arizona's Salt and Verde River systems and the Globe Equity Decree
of I.935quantified rights on the Gila River."
The Adjudications (Gila River and Little Colorado River systems) have
not yet reached the point of identifying the extent of individual water rights."
Instead, the Adjudications have thus far focused on the numerous preliminary
matters arising among the competing interests. These matters include decisions on the constitutionality of Arizona statutes governing general stream adjudications and jurisdictional questions.' While the Arizona Legislature intended the Adjudications to provide more consistency and enforcement of
water rights, in reality, a multiple decade-long adjudication process has put
many water rights holders in a state of limbo.' Until the Adjudications are settled, there is no administrative process to enforce water rights against another

24. Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudcation that Ate Arzona Water Law, 49 ARIz. L. REv. 405,
417 (2007).
25. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-252 (1979); General Stream Adjudication: Overview
of
Genedii
Stream
Adjudication,
MARICOPA
CNTY.
SUPERIOR
COURT,

http://ww.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/SuperiorCourt/GeneralStreanAdjudication/fa
q.asp#2 (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
26. Id
27. Gila River LV, 289 P.3d at 939.
28. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4 5-252(a) (2013).
29. Thorson, supra note 8, at 389.
30. Feller, supianote 24, at 414.
31.

MARICOPA CNTY. SUPERIOR COURT, supranote 25.

32.

Feller, supra note 24, at 426.

33.

MARICOPA CNT. SUPERIOR COURT, supranote 25.

34.

Feller, supra note 24, at 426-27.
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user, because the Superior Court has not yet identified the extent of individual
water rights.Y

IV. THE IV7NTERSDOCTRINE: FEDERAL RESERVED WATER
RIGHTS
Implied federal reserved water rights are an exception to the general rule
that state law governs water rights in the West.' In Witers v. United States,
the US Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, the doctrine of reserved
water rights by holding that water rights were essential for the survival of the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation." In addition to implied federal reserved
water rights for Native American reservations, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized reserved water rights for other types of federal reservations.' These include reserved water rights for national forests,' national monuments,' wildlife refuges, and other types of federal reservations."
Federal reserved water rights are an especially powerful right because water rights reserved by the federal government have a priority date relating to
when the federal government made the reservation." Indeed, in contrast to
state law under the prior appropriation doctrine, federal reserved water rights
do not require the water be put to beneficial use, and thus the right cannot be
abandoned due to nonuse." Furthermore, the quantity of water reserved by
such a reservation is not exclusively measured by historical consumptive use,
but by the amount of water necessary to fulfill the reservation's primary purpose." As the US Supreme Court stated in United States v. New Mexico,
"without the water the purpose of the reservation would be entirely defeated.""
In addition, Congress must reserve land in a manner that "implies Congress'
intention to reserve water sufficient to accomplish congressional purposes.""
Thus, the reservation at issue must have both a federal purpose requiring water and Congressional intent that the reservation use water to achieve its purpose.

35. Id.at427.
36. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source
(Gila RiverIA), 289 P.3d 936, 941 (Ariz. 2012).
37. Id. (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908)).
38. See nfra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
39. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978).
40. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
41. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
42. See id.; United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1415 (9th Cir. 1983).
43. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source
(Gdia River P), 35 P.3d 68, 72 (Ariz. 2001) (however a court will typically quantify historical use
of water at the time of a reservation as a strongindicator of what quantity should be).
44. United States v.Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 493-94 (Colo. 1987). Unlike non-Indian reservations, reserved water rights for Indian reservations also include consideration of "future needs
and changes" when determining the quantity of water reserved. Gia River V 35 P.3d at 73-74
(but the reservation must still prove its anticipated future needs).
45. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700.
46. Thorson, supranote 8, at 460.
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V. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State of Arizona initiated the proceedings leading to the Gila River IX
decision by filing a motion for partial summary judgment to recognize federal
reserved water rights for State Trust Lands ("Motion")." The State filed the
Motion in the Little Colorado River System Adjudication in 1992, and, under
direction from the Superior Court, also filed the same Motion in the Gila River System Adjudication in 2004." With both Adjudications now considering
the issue of State Trust Lands, numerous water rights users in the region opposed the Motion." In 2005, the Superior Court directed the Special Master to
hold a hearing on the Motion and submit findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommendations.'
The Special Master submitted his report to the Superior Court in 2007
and rejected the contention that State Trust Lands have accompanying federal
reserved water rights." The Special Master determined that no withdrawal took
place and that State Trust Lands do not administer a federal purpose." In
2010, the Superior Court adopted the Special Master's report and denied the
Motion.' The State of Arizona filed an interlocutory appeal from the Superior
Court's order and the Arizona Supreme Court granted review based on the
issue's "statewide importance."..
VI. ARIZONA SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Arizona Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Superior Court's order, holding that federal reserved water rights are inapplicable for State Trust
Land." After analyzing the applicable rule of construction at issue, the Court
reached its decision by considering: (i) the nature of the land withdrawal from
the public domain; (ii) any reservation for a federal purpose; and (iii) congressional intent to reserve water.
A. APPLICABLE RULE OF CONSTRUCTION

As an initial matter, the Court considered how it must construe the federal
legislation granting Trust Lands to Arizona.' The Court rejected the State's
47. Report of the Special Master at 4, Gila River IX, 289 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2012) (No. WC11-0001-1R).
48. Id. at 4-5.
49. Id. at 4. Those opposed included Abitibi Consolidated Sales Corporation, Arizona
Public Service, Phelps Dodge Corporation, Aztec Land and Cattle Company, Hopi Tribe,
Navajo Nation, and the United States. Id.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at 76.
52. Id. at 65-75.
53. Apache County Superior Court Order at 1-2, Gila River IX, 289 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2012)
(CV 6417-100).
54. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source
(Gila River IA), 289 P.3d 936, 940 (Ariz. 2012).
55. Id. at 938.
56. Id. at 940.
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argument that the Superior Court construed the federal legislation at issue too
narrowly." The general rule requires a court to construe a federal land grant
narrowly, because "nothing passes by mere implication."' There is a limited
exception providing courts may liberally construe federal legislation "designed
to aid the common schools of the state."" However, this exception only applies
if a narrow interpretation of the federal grant would defeat the grant's purpose.' As Arizona's State Trust Lands have been generating revenue for state
schools (its primary purpose) for more than one hundred years without implied water rights, the Court determined that the common schools exception
did not apply." Thus, the Court applied the traditional, narrow construction to
its examination of the federal land grant to Arizona." The Court noted courts
should be careful when applying implied federal rights because of "the doctrine's disruptive effect in prior appropriation jurisdictions.""
B. NO WITHDRAWAL OR RESERVATION FOR A FEDERAL PURPOSE

The Court concluded the Organic and Enabling Acts granting State Trusts
Lands to Arizona did not adequately withdraw or reserve lands." Specifically,
in Gila River IX, the Court employed its four-part test to analyze the Superior
Court's decision." First, do the reserving documents and underlying legislation
indicate a withdrawal from the public domain?' Second, does the withdrawal
serve a precise federal purpose?" If both threshold questions are satisfied,
then, third, a court must analyze "whether water is essential for the primary
purpose of the reservation."" If water is necessary to carry out the federal purpose, then, fourth, the court determines the quantity of water reserved by analyzing the minimal amount of water required to satisfy that purpose."
1. No Withdrawal from the Public Domain
The Court turned to the documents granting Arizona State Trust Lands
from the federal government to examine whether Arizona's State Trust Lands
were withdrawn from the public domain. A federal withdrawal is the "removal
or segregation of the lands from the operation of the general land laws as the
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U.S. 22, 33-34 (1906)).
59. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489, 508 (1921)).
60. Id. (citing Lyon v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 626 F.3d 1059, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2010);
Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979)).
61. Id. at 940-41.
62. Id. at 941.
63. Id (citing United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d. 1, 26 (Colo. 1982); State
ex rel. State Eng'r v. Comm'r of Pub. Lands (N.M. Comm'), 200 P.3d 86, 95 (N.M. Ct. App.
2008)).
64. Id. at 942.
65. Id. at 941-42.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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initial step in the dedication of the lands to the predetermined purpose."' Furthermore, a withdrawal is intended to "retain the land and preclude disposal.""
The Enabling Act provides that "in addition to sections sixteen and thirty-six,
heretofore reservedfor the Territory of Arizona [by the Organic Act], sections
two and thirty-two in every township . . . are hereby grantedto the State for the
support of common schools." However, a statute using the term "reserve" or
"withdraw" does not necessarily mean Congress intended to withdraw the land
from the public domain."
When the State Trust Lands passed to the State of Arizona, the federal
government did not retain ownership of the land." The Enabling Act provides
lease and sale requirements that the federal government may choose to enforce." However, beneficiary schools always remain under the exclusive control of the state." The Court held this limited federal power to oversight is insignificant compared to the state's "great discretion concerning the disposition
of trust lands."" In addition, both the US Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held administrators may not sell withdrawn land out of federal custody." The Enabling Act allows the state to sell its State Trust Land to the highest bidder at public auction." Thus, Congress did not withdraw Arizona's State
Trust Lands from the public domain because the federal government did not
own the land and expected the state to sell the land to generate revenue."
2. No Reservation for a Federal Purpose
A federal reservation "dedicates land to a specific public use," and that use
must be federal in nature to invoke the federal reserved water rights doctrine."
The Court rejected the State's argument that, because Congress identified
funding public schools as the grant's purpose, Congress reserved the State
Trust Lands for a federal purpose." Although it recognized the important public interest of supporting public schools, the Court noted that states have al-

70. Id. at 942-43.
71. Id. at 943.
72. Id. at 942.
73. Id. (citing S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 784
(10th Cir. 2005)).
74. Id.
75. I. at 939.
76. Id. at 945.
77.
Il at 944.
78. Id. at 943; see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) ("[w]e have no
doubt about the power of the United States under [the Constitutioni to reserve water rights for
its reservations and its property"); Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 748 (9th Cir. 1906)
("when the lands of the government have been legally appropriated or reserved for any purpose,
they become severed from the public lands, and ... no subsequent law or sale should be construed to embrace or operate upon them.").
79. Cila River IX, 289 P.3d at 943.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 785
(10th Cir. 2005); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)).
82. Id.
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ways maintained the power to regulate education.' Thus, the Court concluded
that supporting public schools is not a legitimate federal purpose." Furthermore, the Court relied heavily on a New Mexico Court of Appeals case, New
Mexico ex rel.State Engineer v. Commissioner of Pblc Lands ("New Mexico Commissioner'), which also considered whether New Mexico's State Trust
Lands had implied federal water rights.' In New Mexico Commissioner, the
Court of Appeals held the federal reserved water rights doctrine does not apply to State Trust Land, as the government did not withdraw the land from the
public domain for a federal purpose." In its opinion, the court in New lexico
Commissioner reasoned that although "the support of common schools is a
matter of national interest, [it] cannot conclude that it is also a federal purpose
. . . [as] continuing federal ownership of the reserved lands appears to be a
prerequisite." 8
Finally, the Court in Gila River IX noted Congress clearly reserved other
land through the Enabling Act for a federal purpose." The Enabling Act states
land capable of developing water power is "reserved to the United States" and
"no lands so reserved and excepted shall be subject to any disposition whatsoever."" Unlike education, development of interstate water power falls under
federal jurisdiction under the Connerce Clause." Furthermore, consistent
with the prohibition on selling withheld land, the Enabling Act actively encourages the sale of Trust Lands, while prohibiting the sale of water power
lands." The Court used this section of the Enabling Act to determine Congress
had the expertise to make a clear reservation for a federal purpose, and intentionally chose not to similarly reserve Trust Lands."
C. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO RESERVE WATER RIGHTS

Likewise, the Court held Congress did not intend to reserve water rights
for Arizona State Trust Lands." The Court rejected the State's argument that
the relationship between the federal government and states is similar to the
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes." The Court
observed that the federal-state relationship is different because land grants to
states are not negotiated agreements or treaties that Indian tribes rely upon.'
Therefore, the Court concluded lands granted to states by the federal govern83. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S.
173, 181-82 (1855)).
84. Id.
85. Gia River IX, 289 P.3d at 942 (citing and discussing State exrel. State Eng'r v. Cornm'r
of Pub. Lands (NM. Comrn'i), 200 P.3d 86, 97-98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008)).
86. N.M. Comnm'r, 200 P.3d at 97-98.
87. Id. at 97.
88. Gila River IX 289 P.3d at 944.
89. Id
90. See Federal Power Cornm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1965).
Gila River IX, 289 P.3d at 944.
91.
92. Id. at 945.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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ment are not entitled to the same rights as Indian reservations, for which
courts routinely find implied federal reserved water rights under the Whnters
Doctrine.' Furthermore, the Court also rejected the State's argument that
Congress knew of the region's aridity and so intended to provide water to enhance land's productivity, and thus its value.' The Court found compelling the
fact the Enabling Act increased the grant of land in each township from two to
four sections for Arizona." Legislative history indicates Congress viewed increasing the land grant as a means to compensate Arizona for the lower value
of the land." Thus, the Court held Congress reacted to the lower quality of the
school Trust Lands by doubling the amount of land granted, rather than granting water rights with the land."

VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Court recognized necessary limitations of the federal reserved water
right doctrine in Cia River IX The doctrine is powerful and potentially disruptive to state appropriative water rights. Thus, courts must tread carefully
when asked to extend the scope of the federal reserved water right doctrine.
While the State admirably sought to gain additional revenue for its public
schools in Gila River IX the cost to Arizona citizens was simply too high. If
the Court had allowed the State to'claim reserved water rights for State Trust
Lands, these claims could dramatically undercut existing rights in Arizona's
prior appropriation system. The Court declined to extend the scope of the
doctrine, correctly finding the State Trust Lands did not meet the basic
threshold requirements of the federal reserved water rights doctrine. Gila River IX, together with New Mexico Comrnissioner,rejects the use of federal
reserved rights doctrine on State Trust Lands.' Both Arizona and New Mexico now have a bright-line rule regarding State Trust Lands that other states are
likely to accept.
Yet, the Court in Gila River IX did not need to discuss the policy and logistical implications underpinning its decision, because the State's arguments
failed to meet the basic reservation threshold requirements. The federal reserved water rights doctrine is constantly evolving and its boundaries are not
entirely clear to many observers." The State's argument in Ga River Lwas a
significant stretch under the doctrine's existing case law, but demonstrates how
the elements of federal reserved water rights doctrine operate to preclude such
claims.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id at 938; State errel. State Eng'r v. Comm'r of Pub. Lands (NM Comm'), 200 P.3d
86, 95 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
102. Debbie Leonard, DoctrinalUncertainty in the Law of FederalReserved Water Rghts:
The PotentialImpact on Renewable Energy Development, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 611, 612
(2010).
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The Court followed a four-part test to determine whether Congress impliedly reserved water rights." The last two parts of the test question whether
water is necessary for the primary purpose of the reservation and how much
water is necessary for that purpose.'" These steps promote important policies.
They reflect a judicial intent to protect other water rights holders from overappropriation by federal water rights." However, the Court did not apply these
steps after finding Congress did not withdraw or reserve the land for a federal
purpose and Congress did not iitend to create a federal reservation.
When inquiring after the third element, whether water is essential for the
purpose of the reservation, the answer is likely a resounding no. Water is not
inherently necessary to raise revenue for public schools by selling or using the
State Trust Land. The Land Department has raised revenue with this land for
the past one hundred years without federal water rights." Thus, as a public
policy matter, courts should not recognize senior water rights to a property that
has proven its utility can survive without such rights. Such an action would be
contrary to the policy set forth in United States v. New Mexico, the reserved
rights doctrine will not claim water rights unless absolutely necessary because it
upsets other appropriator's rights in the same stream."'
An even more drastic problem arises when examining how much water
should be set aside for State Trust Lands. If the Court had indeed found implied federal water rights for State Trust Lands, the "minimal need" of water is
potentially unquantifiable in this case. If the purpose of the State Trust Land is
to raise revenue, the greater the reserved water right, the greater the revenue.
Surely the State did not intend to appropriate all the water in the Gila River
and the Little Colorado River, but this highlights the slippery-slope problems
inherent in the existence of the federal reserved water right doctrine." The
doctrine requires a quantified amount to avoid this issue of a theoretically unlimited water right, which could be catastrophic to other appropriators.
It is through analyzing these two final factors that the State's claims truly
become unreasonable and dangerous to otherwise established property rights
in Arizona. Winters set forth the federal reserved water rights doctrine in order to protect and nurture reservations that would otherwise fail their intended
purposes.'" Arizona's State Trust Lands continue serving their purpose today,
and continue to raise revenue for public schools. The State attempted to maneuver around policies that support the implied reserved water rights doctrine
by asking for federal water rights to serve the now state-owned Trust Land.
Gila RiverIXrecognizes an important boundary on the federal reserved water
103.
104.
105.
Source
106.

Gda RiverlX, 289 P.3d at 94142.
Id.
See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System &
(Gila River ", 35 P.3d 68, 70 (Ariz. 2001).
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108. Walter Rusinek, A Preview of ConngAttractions?Wyoming v. United States and the
Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 EcOLOGY L.Q. 355, 360 (1990).
109. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); see United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. at 699.
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right doctrine; a decision that is further supported by the doctrine's full analysis and its policy implications.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Court in Gila River IX clearly rejects the application of the federal reserved water rights doctrine to State Trust Lands. The Court based its decision
on its findings that Arizona's State Trust Lands were not withdrawn from the
federal domain or reserved for a federal purpose, nor did Congress intend to
provide water rights for those lands. However, the Court's decision also aligns
with the protective policy implications underpinning the federal reserved water
rights doctrine.

